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MEANING AND PROFESSIONALISM IN 
AMERICAN LAW* 
Paul D. Carrington** 
The Emperor Justinian boasted that his Code would never re-
quire the attention of lawyers, because his law was written in such 
plain language that every literate person would forever comprehend 
its mandates. I As of course we know, lawyers and jurists have for 
many centuries since argued over the meaning of the good Em-
peror's Code and of those later codes written to replace his with 
language plainer still. 
In striving for perfect clarity, Justinian had two great advan-
tages. As Emperor, he was free to utter mandates of his own choos-
ing and to express them precisely in words of his own choosing. 
Also, in writing laws chiefly for use in resolving private disputes 
rather than to organize or control his own imperial government or 
even to regulate a national economy, he had less need for complex 
norms. Despite these advantages, the language of his Codes proved 
to be highly indeterminate. 
Nevertheless, a substantial measure of certainty was afforded 
by Justinian's work. Many, many disputes were resolved by refer-
ence to his Code and many transactions planned and consummated 
in confidence that judicial decisions had been predicted within the 
limits of a tolerable margin of error. 
It is unlikely that any of these predictions were achieved by 
reference to the thoughts of Emperor Justinian himself. It would 
have been preposterous for those relying on his Codes to have pur-
sued Justinian's own "original understanding." First, because his 
knowledge and understanding of what he decreed was extremely 
shallow. And, second, because the inquiry would have defeated the 
• This paper was presented to the Association of American Law Schools Workshop 
on Constitutional Law, January 6, 1993. 
•• Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. 
I. This is inferred from C. 7 .45.13, which sets forth the maxim non exemplis sed /egibus 
indicandum est, meaning that the cases should be decided according to the statutory text, not 
examples, such as earlier decisions of judges, for these might be wrong. See XIV The Civil 
Law 188-89 (S.P. Scott, ed., Central Trust Co., 1932). 
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Emperor's purpose, which was to proclaim a common understand-
ing shared by all subjects of the imperial crown. 
The stability of the Roman law was achieved by studious law-
yers, who by reason of their professional training came to share a 
substantial measure of common understanding about the meanings 
of Latin words when encountered in legal contexts.z Legal texts 
meant what the lawyers of that time and place meant when using 
those words to signal to one another about a matter of professional 
import. Thus, in an important sense, Roman law was from its be-
ginning "reader-centered," and in this sense "post-modem." To 
provide the community of shared understanding that gave legal ut-
terances meaning was the social and political function of the juris-
consults who met and debated cases in the baths of Rome. 
Few if any Americans engaged in drafting the Constitution of 
the United States had Justinian's illusions. They did not suppose 
that the meaning of their utterances would be forever "plain." Nor 
did they suppose that the Congress of the United States would 
speak in plainer language than Justinian had been able to muster. 
Indeed, to the contrary, the Founders were at pains to prevent Con-
gress from speaking too plainly. In contrast to Parliament, for ex-
ample, which often spoke and continues to speak in a unitary voice, 
the American legislative power was divided in order to compel com-
promise among factions.3 And political compromises tend to be ex-
pressed in language laden with meanings and nuances not 
necessarily the same to all the compromising groups. What the 
Founders clearly contemplated was that their brief Constitution and 
the later enactments of the divided government they created would 
often speak loosely, in terms that might be subject to competing and 
contrasting interpretations. 
How did they expect that these problems of language they so 
freely created would be resolved? Not, we can confidently assert, on 
the basis of legislative history. The Founders had no apparent in-
terest in what we today describe by that term, even in the legislative 
history that they themselves made. James Madison was quite ex-
plicit in regard to the publication of his Notes on the 1787 Conven-
tion. He insisted that they should never be used to supply meaning 
to the words he had employed as principal draftsman. He empha-
sized that it was not his intent or that of the Founders whose 
2. See generally, John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 122-47 (U. of Mich. Law 
School, 1968). 
3. For an insightful treatment of the implications of parliamentary coherence, see P.S. 
Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative 
Study of Legal Reasoning. Legal Theory. and Legal Institutions 298-325 (Clarendon Press, 
1987). 
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thoughts he uttered that mattered. He was the "original" and it 
was his understanding that there was no "original understanding" 
among the Founders, but merely acceptance of the words embodied 
in the charter itself, words to be understood by those who ratified 
it, 4 and thus by the professional audience that would interpret them. 
Madison was in this limited sense yet another "post-modern" per-
son, and he would have had little regard for the efforts of those who 
today seek to discern an "original understanding" of the Constitu-
tion, an "understanding" that he believed never to have existed any 
more than did Justinian's understanding of the Code that he de-
creed.s As in Roman times, the meaning of our legal texts would be 
discerned from the shared understanding of the profession that en-
forced them. 
Thus, aware as they were of the existence of a professional 
community of lawyers capable of forming a shared understanding of 
the meanings of words, most of the Founders would have supposed 
that at least some of their words had, and some of the utterances of 
Congress would have, "plain meanings" in the sense that any per-
son acquainted with the professional culture of law in America 
would comprehend one meaning and no other. And even in cir-
cumstances of ambiguity, they might have imagined two or perhaps 
even three plausible meanings of a text, but not an infinite number 
depending on the imagination of the individual reader. 
The Founders' hopes and expectations were fulfilled in the ca-
reer of John Marshall. Marshall's great achievement was to organ-
ize his Court as an effective instrument for supplying meaning to 
the nation's legal texts. The institutional means by which Marshall 
achieved the Founders' purpose was the innovation of the opinion 
of the court, a device previously unknown. The legal world in Eng-
land and elsewhere was familiar with individual judicial opinions 
given orally and seriatim and reported at the whim of such persons 
as might designate themselves as reporters of those opinions. But 
nowhere was there experience with a court that regularly published 
reasoned statements of its decisions. 6 
4. Madison does seem to have regarded the legislative history of the ratifiers to have 
had some legitimacy, inasmuch as the State Conventions that conferred on the Constitution 
"all the authority which it possesses." Madison to Thomas Ritchie, Sept. 15, 1821. 3 Letters 
and Other Writings of James Madison 228 (J.B. Lippincott, 1865). 
5. For those wishing to question this characterization of Madison, the place to begin is 
Donald 0. Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 Am. J. Legal 
Hist. 38 (1971). 
6. For an account of the invention of the opinion of the court, see George L. Haskins 
and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 383-87 (Macmil-
lan, 1981). There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council 
giving advice to the Crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution, at least 
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The opinion of the Court did at least two things. It forced the 
members of the Court to compose their differences to the extent 
that they were able. To this extent, it brought compromise or group 
judgment into the judicial process. Texts thus were made to mean 
what a group of moderately diverse American lawyers serving ap-
pointments for life would take their words to mean. But more, the 
opinion of the Court was a discipline that forced the Court to give 
reasons that other lawyers could understand and respect even when 
they did not agree. The opinions of the Marshall Court served to 
reveal the Court to its constituency and audience, the legal profes-
sion, as an institution striving to conform its use of power to the 
reasonable expectations of fellow professionals, who were in tum 
striving to comprehend and interpret language in the collective na-
tional interest. Thus our texts came more specifically to mean what 
a group of lawyers serving appointments for life and subject to the 
discipline of providing generally persuasive written justification for 
their collective action would take their words to mean. When read 
in that light by a person acquainted with the professional culture, 
there is indeed much of our national law that has "plain meaning." 
The Marshall Court's willingness to try to unite on the mean-
ing of such phrases as "due process of law," and to explain them to 
a professional audience, proved to be a powerful device for enhanc-
ing the moral authority of the Court. This did not commend it, of 
course, to those whose disagreements with Marshall were deep and 
abiding, such as Jefferson's friend, John Taylor. Taylor, in an 1820 
book (bearing a title equally suited to 1992: Construction Construed 
and Constitutions Vindicated), deconstructed the Marshall Court's 
decisions, revealing them to be the product of the aristocratic im-
pulses of its members. The opinion of the Court, despite its proven 
vulnerability to deconstruction, was nevertheless a device quickly 
replicated, first in American state courts, and then in Europe. 7 
John Marshall created a new industry, never before known to the 
world, of timely reportage and publication of judicial opinions. 
Marshall's innovation, like all successful political innovations, 
grew out of the cultural soil. In the America of his time, it was 
widely perceived that judges were a part of a somewhat elite and 
pretentious profession that was vested with a public interest, a sort 
of public utility not wholly dissimilar from the jurisconsults of 
until the Privy Council Appeals Act of 1832. F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of 
England 462-63 (Cambridge U. Press, 1908). See generally, John P. Dawson, The Privy 
Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart Period: II, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 627 (1950). 
7. See Dawson, The Oracles of the Law at 82, 402, 438 (cited in note 2). And see J.H. 
Baker, Records, Reports and the Origins of Case-Law in England in John H. Baker, ed., Judi-
cial Records, Law Reports, and the Growth of Case Law 15 (Duncker & Humblot, 1989). 
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Rome. Judges were seen as fiduciaries, and the federal judges were 
to be trustees of our political institutions. While there was general 
recognition that these trustees were possessed of ordinary human 
failings and widespread concern that these failings would result in 
abuse, it was accepted as a necessity that the success of the experi-
ment in democratic governance would depend on the good faith of 
the judiciary, a good faith that would be kept or not depending on 
the morality of the legal profession of which the judiciary would 
necessarily be a part. 
Indeed this perceived connection between the fate of the repub-
lic and the morality of the legal profession is what excited the sub-
stantial interest of the American revolutionaries in legal education. 
Jefferson and Hamilton, and their contemporaries in almost every 
state, sought to promote legal education as a means of assuring a 
faithful judiciary.s In the succeeding generation, Henry Clay, per-
haps the most consequential national figure for four decades, was 
one of the founders of the Transylvania University Law Depart-
ment.9 Clay's partisans, and even those of his most intense rival, 
Andrew Jackson, sustained their predecessors' keen interest in legal 
education as an essential element of democratic governance.w 
Their politics were at cross-purposes, but they shared the aim to 
develop and sustain a professional community that understood the 
meaning of the nation's legal texts and a judiciary mindful of a 
moral obligation to exercise the lash of power to implement those 
texts in accordance with that common understanding. The premier 
legal subject in the nation's colleges and law departments was thus 
Constitutional Law, not Contracts. 
One expression of the conventional thinking of Marshall's time 
is found in the work of Hugh Henry Brackenridge.tt Brackenridge 
was a Princeton classmate and friend of James Madison, a poet, a 
military chaplain at Valley Forge, a Pennsylvania politician who led 
the campaign for ratification and then organized the Jeffersonian 
Republican Party of western Pennsylvania, a frontier lawyer, a nov-
elist and at last a judge. Law and politics was the subject of his 
8. Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 527 (1990). 
9. Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Law and Virtue at Transylvania University: The 
George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41 Mercer L. Rev. 673 (1990). 
10. The New York University School of Law first opened in 1835 under the leadership 
of Benjamin F. Butler, a "barnburner" Jacksonian. See Ronald L. Brown, The Law School 
Papers of Benjamin F. Butler (Greenwood Press, 1987). 
II. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhortation from the Spirit 
of the Hon. Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 705 
(1992). See also Madeline Sapienza, Modern Chivalry in Early American Law: H. H. Brack-
enridge's Legal Thought (University Press, 1992). 
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serialized novel, Modern Chivalry, which was widely read in the 
years following its first appearance 200 years ago. Brackenridge 
also in 1814 published Law Miscellanies, a work devoted exclusively 
to law and the legal profession and addressed to legal novices. 
Brackenridge commenced his discourse on the meaning of legal 
texts with a Roman maxim that he translated to mean: "It is the 
worst slavery where the law is unknown, or uncertain."'2 He pro-
claimed that maxim to be the teaching of experience wherever peo-
ple have tried to dispense with professional legal judgment, as they 
did in his time in Pennsylvania. Where the law is unknown and 
unknowable, the persons wielding the lash of power are, Bracken-
ridge observed, out of control and prone to be abusive. Chaos re-
sults, and despotism generally follows chaos. 
Yet he acknowledged that there is inevitably much uncertainty 
in legal texts. "But there is the spirit, that is the construction of 
laws. This depends upon the mind of the construer; and two men 
may not in some cases, construe alike."'3 What informs a legal text 
is reason, and hence the maxim that "nothing which is against rea-
son, can be law."'4 He emphasized that even unwritten law can be 
reasonably certain if committed to the understanding of a profes-
sional community. He noted that some of his contemporaries, nota-
bly Rousseau and Godwin, denied the efficacy of legal texts and 
sought to confer on judges and other officers uncabined discretion 
to infer such meanings on those texts as might suit their purposes of 
the moment. This he decried as the despotism of the Ottomans. It 
is to limit ukase that laws are enacted; to secure constancy of inter-
pretation and construction, Brackenridge invoked professional 
morality. 
Thus Brackenridge celebrated the judiciary as the "belt of Pro-
tagoras"'s that held the nation together; he deplored the actions of 
his hero, Jefferson, in attacking the federal judiciary. He empha-
sized that the primary qualification for judicial work was not intel-
lect, useful though that might be. Although himself one of the 
stronger intellects of his time, and especially of his community, and 
although he most strongly favored the development of academic in-
stitutions, the judge did not regard intellectual attainment as a pri-
mary requirement for judicial work. "The knowledge of all law 
goes but a little way to the discerning the justice of the cause .... 
[I]f my cause is good, and I am to have my choice of two judges, the 
12. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry 541 (Claude M. Newlin, ed., Ameri-
can Book Co., 1937). This novel was published in installments between 1792 and 1815. 
13. Id. at 542. 
14. ld. 
15. ld. at 786. 
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one of great legal science, but deficient in natural judgment; the 
other of good natural judgment, but of no legal knowledge, I would 
take the one that had what we call common sense."t6 
On the other hand, Brackenridge counseled young lawyers that 
a lifetime was not long enough to learn all that one might usefully 
know about law. "Mere genius," he affirmed, "goes but a little way 
in making the lawyer; there must be a plodding and often the plod-
ding student will reach the goal when a more lively talent will not. 
A court and even a jury will rather hear him who has some depth of 
judgment but without volubility or grace of diction than all the ele-
gant vociferations where the knowledge is pretense."t7 But more 
important than hard-earned legal knowledge was sound judgment, 
or as Brackenridge described it, common sense. And more impor-
tant still was a morality of self-restraint. There is, the judge af-
firmed, "such a thing as patriotism on the bench."ts 
No one in Brackenridge's time doubted that legal decisions en-
tailed political ones. But he emphasized that judging is an anti-
democratic activity, especially where the power of judicial review is 
exercised by life tenure appointees. For this reason, he said that any 
judicial decision invalidating legislation 
must be a plain and broad case that will justify the interference, 
or render it safe to make the experiment. An omnipotent legisla-
ture will not readily yield to any thing but that which will carry 
the sense of the community with it.t9 ... [S]crewing up the con-
struction of the constitution too tight, the public mind will revolt 
against it. Driven to a contention, much that is valuable in the 
constitution might be lost in that torrent which an overstrained 
construction had produced, like waters in a dam without a ftood-
gate.2o 
Brackenridge affirmed that the willingness and ability of judges 
to practice self-restraint, to repress their "personal and factious con-
siderations," was dependent on the expectations of the legal profes-
sion of which the judiciary was a part. If there were not a legal 
16. ld. at 616-17. Redolent of Senator Hruska's plea for mediocrity on the Supreme 
Court of United States was Brackenridge's observation that "A man of very moderate parts 
can fill an office perhaps the better for being moderate .... " Quoted in Claude M. Newlin, 
The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge 273 (Princeton U. Press, 1932). 
17. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Law Miscellanies: Containing an Introduction to the 
Study of Law With Some Law Cases and a Variety of Other Matters Chiefly Original xvii-xviii 
(1814) (Amo Pressed., 1972) ("Law Miscellanies"). 
18. Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry at 544 (cited in note 12). Patriotism is needed be-
cause "[A] great difficulty arises, in the administration of the laws, to guard the consciences 
of men." ld. at 543. 
19. Brackenridge, Law Miscellanies at 67 (cited in note 17). 
20. Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry at 545 (cited in note 12). 
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audience to applaud self-restraint and to chastise self-indulgence, 
the judiciary would likely break its trust. He called upon his young 
readers to provide just such a professional audience. Pointing to 
post-revolutionary France, he noted that a nation without lawyers 
has no stability. "What could you expect," he asked "in return 
from despotism but the opposite extreme? In the state of the public 
mind in France, what was there to arrest at a medium? ... You 
might as well expect the stone of Sysiphus down hill, of itself, to 
stop short at a proper point."2t 
The most illuminating early work on the meaning of our legal 
texts is that of Francis Lieber. Lieber, a German-American immi-
grant, was teaching Constitutional Law at South Carolina in 1838 
when he published a two-volume work entitled A Manual of Legal 
and Political Ethics and a shorter work entitled Legal Hermeneu-
tics.22 The latter was originally embodied in the former, but at the 
suggestion of some readers of the manuscript it was broken out for 
separate publication. 
Lieber was recognized by his contemporaries, including James 
Kent and Joseph Story, as perhaps the premier legal academic of 
antebellum times. His works, which included one book entitled 
Civil Liberties and Self Government, were kept in circulation 
throughout the nineteenth century as a result of late editions by 
such distinguished persons as President Woolsey of Yale and Presi-
dent Gilman of Johns Hopkins. He deserves much greater notice 
among law teachers than he has received. 
Lieber's writings of 1838 drew heavily on classical sources. He 
was on intimate terms with Roman traditions. He also drew on the 
body of literature developed in theology to establish a discipline of 
interpretation of religious texts, the learning that provided the rudi-
ments of later literary criticism. But Francis Lieber was animated 
not by his affection for the classics or the scholarly discipline of 
literary criticism, but by his passionate regard for democratic con-
stitutionalism as it was then emerging in America. His works on 
ethics proposed standards of conduct for public officers and for citi-
zens at large in exercising their franchise. The inculcation of these 
standards was the sovereign aim of most early American law teach-
ers, including Joseph Story, who assigned Lieber's books to be read 
by his Harvard students. Had Lieber appeared in America a decade 
earlier, Jefferson probably would have selected him to be the law 
professor at his university. 
21. Brackenridge, Modem Chivalry at 564 (cited in note 12). 
22. See Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political 
Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. Legal Ed. 339 (1992). 
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For Lieber, Constitutional Law was a branch of the law of 
Trusts. All of us as citizens are, in his view, fiduciaries. We have 
no rights, he repeatedly affirms, that are not linked to duties. Espe-
cially those exercising power or influence on public affairs have du-
ties to their fellow citizens. For Lieber, the principles of 
interpretation and construction are an important part of the stan-
dards of public ethics, dictates as to how those who apply the lash 
of power conform their conduct to the common understanding of 
texts to which their actions give meaning.23 His hermeneutics are 
intended to guide judges and others in the repression of the "per-
sonal and factious considerations" Brackenridge described as ever 
tending to subvert one's professional judgment about the meaning 
of legal texts. 
Lieber was fully cognizant of the problem of indeterminacy. 
Indeed, he catalogues its many causes. And he even extols its bene-
fits, observing that many political and legal blunders can result from 
excessive effort to be precise and unambiguous. He cautions draft-
ers of legal texts with a couplet he found on the wall of a tailor 
shop: "tight will tear, wide will wear."24 
Lieber joins Madison in questioning the utility of legislative 
history or original understandings. He asserts that the motives of 
the utterers of legal texts cannot be known except from the language 
of their texts.2s 
Yet Lieber asserts that every text has a single, correct meaning 
that can generally be discerned by his interpretive methods calling 
not for literal-mindedness, but for interpretation that remains close 
to the text but mindful of its context.26 Sometimes, Lieber acknowl-
edges, circumstances require that meaning be constructed outside 
the text,27 but this should be done with much caution to avoid 
usurpations. 
Both construction and interpretation are to be guided by con-
siderations of the public interest as seen through the spectacles of 
the community to be served. This discipline requires resistance to 
meanings that the interpreter may personally prefer, or may find 
most congenial to factional interests that he or she may favor. 
Whether or not the judge rejoices in what the public reckons to be 
23. For another contemporary review of Lieber, see James Farr, The Americanization of 
Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics in Gregory Leyh, ed., Legal 
Hermeneutics 83 (U. of Cal. Press, 1992). 
24. Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics 195 (William G. Hammond, ed., 
F.H. Thomas, 1880). This work was first published in 1838. 
25. ld. at 102. 
26. Id. at 11·12. 
27. ld. at Ill. 
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its interest, he or she, Lieber tells us, cannot "run against the move-
ment of' his or her time.2s Laws and courts, he tells us, must be 
seen by citizens to operate for the advantage of society. The inter-
preter of the law must therefore be careful not to misjudge his or 
her own time, for everyone desiring to justify extravagant construc-
tion can do so on the ground that a case is peculiar or a time 
critical.29 
Lieber thus understands that his principles of interpretation 
and construction are no more than loose guides. He would have 
been unsurprised to have applied to them the criticism that Karl 
Llewellyn was later to make of the canons of statutory construc-
tion.3o For every thrust by one such canon, Llewellyn informed us, 
there is an appropriate parry by another. Lieber knew that his prin-
ciples were as vulnerable to misuse as the legal texts they were 
designed to illuminate. What he sought to foster by his teaching 
was not an empty formalism based on rules of hermeneutics, but a 
spirit of duty and of respect for the rights and reasonable expecta-
tions of lawyers advising clients, even those clients whom the per-
son wielding the lash of power might despise. 
Lieber does not expect to locate the discipline and the wisdom 
required for wise interpretation in every citizen. He discerns that 
most persons lacking professional discipline are prone to forget 
"that there are two parties in questions of justice" or that the law is 
"not one [found] within [one's own] breast."3I Lieber is cautious 
about lawyers and counsels drafters of legal texts against needless 
intricacy, which he describes as a national curse because it can 
"unite the lawyers into a compact, formidable and privileged class, 
to be compared only to the priesthood of some nations, ruling the 
uninitiated."32 But in the end, he affirms the indispensability of the 
legal profession as the instrument of self-discipline in interpretation. 
In asserting the relation between the ethics of the legal profes-
sion and the efficacy of our law, the work of Brackenridge and 
Lieber lends support to the thesis advanced by Judge Harry Ed-
wards in a recent issue of the Michigan Law Review: that the ex-
isting and seemingly growing disjunction between the commercial 
impulses of much of the bar and the academized and theoretical 
28. ld. at 126. 
29. Id. at 129. 
30. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About how Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). 
31. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 41 (cited in note 24). 
32. ld. at 155. 
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impulses of many law teachers is not good for the law.33 To inter-
pret legal texts wisely, the practitioners must lay aside the private 
interests of their clients and the teachers must lay aside the impulse 
to creativity and novelty. 
I would like to conclude by speculating on what Lieber would 
say to his successors teaching Constitutional Law 120 years after his 
death. Being one who ever exulted in his own good fortune, he 
would, I think, emphasize the enormity of the privileges enjoyed by 
those who teach Constitutional Law in America. He would cite our 
freedom and independence as unequalled in all history. He would 
then affirm that these rights, like all others, bear duties, in our case 
to use our fortunate status wisely and with restraint. He would re-
mind us that we are not called to our roles as law teachers to manip-
ulate legal texts for the advantage of some cause of great interest to 
ourselves or to our academic colleagues. He would declare that as 
fiduciaries, when interpreting legal texts, we are obliged to silence 
within ourselves those "personal and factious considerations" tend-
ing to deflect our professional judgment as to what legal texts mean. 
It was ever his boast that he absolutely "belong(ed) to no party" 
when teaching.34 And he ever cautioned against the indulgence of 
emotions allowed to 
run so high that the greatest link and tie of humanity, language, 
loses its very essence, and people cease to understand one an-
other, when even the best-intended words ... are unintentionally 
yet passionately or willfully wronged, misconstrued, wrung from 
their very sense.3s 
Lieber insisted that, even where there is ambiguity, there is one 
meaning of the law that best fits the interests of us all. While it is 
the task of the legal scholar to unfold that meaning, it is framed not 
by the expectations and understandings of the legal academy but by 
those of the larger legal profession of which we are a part. And 
those expectations are in turn informed by the culture of which the 
legal profession is a part and a product. In his insistence on one 
meaning, he reminds us that we can have but one Constitution and 
one body of national law. The most elementary meaning of equal 
protection of the law requires that all our law must be the same for 
33. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 9! Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992). 
34. Francis Lieber, The Ancient and the Modern Teacher of Politics in I The Misceo-
/aneous Writings of Francis Lieber 374 (Daniel C. Gilman, ed., J.B. Lippincott, 1881). See 
also letter to Oscar Lieber, Nov. 1860, in Thomas Perry, The Life and Letters of Francis 
Lieber 313 (J.R. Osgood, 1882). 
35. Francis Lieber, II Manual of Political Ethics 262 (Theodore D. Woolsey, ed, J.B. 
Lippincott, 1888). 
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all of us and cannot have different meanings according to the gen-
der, color or ethnic identity of the person interpreting it. It is in 
that important sense that we are one profession; however conflicted 
our politics, we are obliged to read our texts together as one. To do 
so is perhaps the central attribute of being professionals. If the ad-
herents of both Jefferson and Hamilton, and of Clay and Jackson, 
could unite on that understanding of legal professionalism, so can 
we. 
